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Chapter — Counterparty Risk

Safety From the Insurance Side

Most wealth-structuring literature asks what a policy does for the client. The harder question — and the one a UHNWI family office should ask first — is what happens to my assets if the insurer itself fails, misbehaves, or is captured. Mauritius answers that question in statute. A SILIB policy is built so that the insurer never becomes the single point of failure.

5Independent statutory barriers between a failed insurer and the client's assets
1 : 1One dedicated segregated portfolio per policy — never a pooled fund
FirstRank of insurance claims against all other claims on winding up
0Encumbrances permitted over policy assets, save the custodian's own fees
The real counterparty question

Every insurance wrapper is a promise. The question is what stands behind it.

When a family places USD 5m, 50m or 500m into a life-insurance wrapper, they exchange direct ownership of assets for a contractual claim against an insurance company. That is the trade. Everything that follows — tax deferral, succession mechanics, creditor protection, treaty access — rests on that claim being worth something in the worst case.

In a conventional unit-linked policy or offshore portfolio bond, the honest answer is uncomfortable. The client's money is typically invested in pooled internal funds shared with every other linked policyholder. The assets sit on the insurer's own balance sheet. There is often no independent custodian owing the client anything. If the carrier's investment book, its shareholder, or another block of business fails, the policyholder discovers that their "segregation" was an accounting convention.

SILIB was drafted to remove each of those weaknesses individually. Not as marketing — as licence conditions, rules with criminal sanction, and an insolvency waterfall that puts the policyholder first.

“Each structured investment-linked insurance policy is backed by a segregated fund which is specific to that one policy, whereas the assets of linked long term insurance policies are pooled together and open to all linked long term policyholders.” Financial Services Commission, Mauritius — SILIB FAQ, Q12
“The assets under each structured investment-linked insurance policy have to be segregated and held separately for each policyholder with a custodian. Custodians and any sub-custodians must be approved by the FSC.” Financial Services Commission, Mauritius — SILIB FAQ, Q7
Architecture

Five independent barriers, each in a different body of law

Structural safety does not come from one strong wall. It comes from barriers that a hostile party would have to defeat in different legal disciplines, in different fora, at the same time. SILIB supplies five.

Barrier One

The assets are not in the insurer's hands

An insurer writing SILIB must appoint and maintain at all times at least one custodian approved by the FSC, and must obtain FSC approval before signing the custody agreement. The custodian — and any sub-custodian — must act independently of both the insurer and the asset manager. A sub-custodian may only be a bank, a bank's trust-company subsidiary, or a bank's trustee subsidiary.

This is the decisive difference. On the insurer's failure, the assets are not part of a pool the liquidator is holding; they are already in a regulated third party's custody, identified to one policy.

SILIB Rules 2022, r.4(3)r.5r.6(4)r.7(1)
Barrier Two

A statutory ring-fence around the fund

Beyond custody, insurance law itself walls off the money. A long-term insurer must maintain separate insurance funds and, inside them, a designated fund per class of business. The assets of a designated fund “shall be kept separate from the other assets of an insurer”, and may not be transferred or applied for anything other than the claims and expenses of that business, except out of an actuarially established surplus.

The SILIB fund itself is defined in the Rules as the Reserve Fund plus the Designated Fund — the Reserve Fund existing only where something is genuinely guaranteed.

Insurance Act 2005, s.17s.18(3)s.18(4)SILIB Rules, r.2, r.15
Barrier Three

Absolute priority on winding up

Section 63 of the Insurance Act overrides other enactments to the extent of any inconsistency and states that “any debt or other liabilities arising out of contracts of insurance issued or underwritten by an insurer shall rank in priority before any other claim against the assets of the insurer.”

For a long-term insurer it goes further: assets representing the designated funds “shall be available only for meeting the liabilities of the insurer attributable to that fund.” Banks, tax authorities, litigation claimants and shareholders all queue behind the policyholder.

Insurance Act 2005, s.63(1)s.63(2)s.63(4)(a)
Barrier Four

No one may pledge the client's assets

A custody agreement for SILIB assets may not provide for the creation of any encumbrance over those assets — the single exception being the custodian's or sub-custodian's own fees and expenses for acting in that capacity.

That one sentence removes the classic failure mode of offshore insurance: assets quietly rehypothecated, pledged to the carrier's lenders, or used as collateral inside a group. It cannot be done, and it cannot be papered over in the custody contract.

SILIB Rules 2022, r.8(2)
Barrier Five

A direct claim against the custodian

This is the provision most advisers overlook. Under the Rules, the custodian is liable to the insurer and to its SILIB policyholders for any loss resulting from unreasonable failure or improper performance of its obligations. Where a sub-custodian is used, the agreement must give the insurer the means to enforce policyholders' rights against assets held by the sub-custodian.

The client therefore has a cause of action that does not run through the insurer at all. If the carrier is insolvent, uncooperative, or under sanction, the claim against the custodian survives independently.

SILIB Rules 2022, r.9(1)r.9(2)
Reinforcement

Custody breach is a criminal offence

Mauritius did not leave custody to contract. The Insurance Act makes it a criminal offence for any person other than an approved custodian to hold the assets of a SILIB policy for safekeeping, and for an insurer to permit it — with a fine of up to MUR 1 million and imprisonment of up to five years.

Directors and officers of a carrier face personal criminal exposure for the exact behaviour that has destroyed offshore policyholders elsewhere. That is a far stronger deterrent than any contractual covenant.

Insurance Act 2005, s.85A
Stress test

What actually happens if the insurer fails

Follow the sequence. At no point does the policyholder become an ordinary unsecured creditor of a collapsed company competing with banks and trade creditors for a dividend.

1

The assets are already elsewhere

The policy's dedicated portfolio sits with an FSC-approved custodian, identified to that one policy, unencumbered. It is not free property of the insurer for a liquidator to gather in. SILIB Rules r.4(3), r.6, r.8(2)

2

The regulator, not the shareholder, controls the outcome

No insurer may be wound up voluntarily without the FSC's prior written authority, and authority is only given where arrangements satisfactory to the FSC exist to meet all policy liabilities. A liquidator must continue the insurance business under FSC or Court direction rather than simply liquidating it. Insurance Act ss.60, 64

3

Liabilities are valued by an independent actuary

In a winding up, long-term policy liabilities are calculated by the method and basis determined by an actuary appointed by the Commission — not by the insurer's own estimates or its shareholder's preferred numbers. Insurance Act s.62

4

The designated fund is reserved to its own policyholders

Assets representing the designated fund are available only for the liabilities attributable to that fund. Other classes of business, and the insurer's general creditors, are excluded from it. Insurance Act s.63(4)(a)

5

Insurance claims rank first against everything else

Any remaining deficiency is met out of the insurer's other assets, with unsatisfied policy liabilities still ranking ahead of every other claim. Shareholders receive nothing until policyholders and creditors are paid in full. Insurance Act ss.63(2), 63(3)(c), 66(2)

6

Portfolio transfer rather than fire sale

The liquidator may transfer the assets and liabilities to another insurer under FSC supervision, and may seek the appointment of a special manager where existing policyholders' interests require it — preserving continuity of the contract instead of crystallising a loss. Insurance Act ss.60(2), 60(4)

Before insolvency ever arises

The conflict-of-interest firewall — where policyholders are usually harmed

Most losses in offshore insurance are not caused by carrier failure. They are caused by carriers and managers monetising a captive policyholder: house funds, related-party paper, undisclosed fees, and advice given by people not qualified to give it. SILIB legislates against each of those, individually.

No related-party investment, no related-party lendingThe insurer may not invest SILIB assets in the securities of any related company of the insurer or of the asset manager, and may not lend SILIB monies to them. All transactions must be at arm's length and consistent with the policy's stated investment objectives. r.17(1)–(4)
Only disclosed fees may be takenNothing may be paid out of the Designated Fund that was not provided for in the product summary and the policy — and no payment may be made that is unfair or materially prejudicial to any policyholder or prospective policyholder. r.16(1)
Performance fees are disciplinedThey must be disclosed, calculated only after all other payments, accrue over an appropriate period, and crystallise no more than once a year. Where a fee may be levied even on a negative return, that must be stated. r.19
The custodian reports the insurer to the regulatorEvery custody agreement must require the custodian to report forthwith to the FSC any failure by the asset manager or insurer to meet the requirements applicable to the sound conduct of their business. The client has a watchdog inside the structure. r.8(1)(g)
Only dual-licensed professionals may adviseAdvice on a SILIB policy may only be given by a person holding both an Insurance Broker Licence and an Investment Adviser (Unrestricted) Licence, or by an independent financial adviser licensed in an equivalent foreign jurisdiction. Mis-selling risk is addressed at the gate. r.11
The product itself was vetted before issueSILIB approval requires an actuarial certificate, a prescribed product summary, the policy wording, a benefit illustration and disclosure of who manages the assets — and the actuary must certify that the design, administration and management of the policy comply with the Act. r.4(2), First & Second Schedules
AML discipline applies at two levelsThe insurer conducts customer due diligence on the policyholder. The custodian conducts its own due diligence at its own level — and its client is the insurer, a licensed Mauritian long-term insurer, not the policyholder. The benefit to the family is therefore indirect but real: the carrier itself must satisfy the onboarding standards of a bank-grade institution before a single asset is held, and must keep satisfying them. r.14(1)–(2); FIAMLA 2002
Liquidity and transparency are mandatedAt least 5% of each policy's total assets, or USD 20,000 — whichever is lower — must be held in cash or cash equivalents; and a full annual statement covering guarantees, market value, surrender value, penalties, fees and commission must reach the policyholder within 30 days of each policy anniversary. r.13, r.18(3)–(4); Insurance Act s.82(1)(c)

An insurer cannot resign. A trustee can.

Continuity as a risk control

A licensed insurer is bound to its contract for its full term and cannot walk away from the policyholder; where it fails, the FSC and the Court manage the outcome and a transfer to another insurer is the preferred remedy. A professional trustee, by contrast, can resign — and where no successor will accept the appointment, the structure becomes paralysed. Continuity of the counterparty is itself an asset-protection feature, and it is one of the few that cannot be replicated by drafting.

Side by side

Insurance-side risk, compared across structures

The comparison below is limited to carrier-side and custody risk. It says nothing about tax outcomes, which depend entirely on the policyholder's own residence.

Scroll the table sideways to compare →

Risk axis SILIB policy (Mauritius) Conventional unit-linked / portfolio bond Cell of a protected cell company
Unit of segregationOne dedicated portfolio per policyPooled internal funds shared across policyholdersThe cell — which may contain many participants
Where the assets are heldFSC-approved independent custodian, outside the insurerTypically on the insurer's own balance sheetBy the company, or through a nominee
Independent custodian owing duties to the clientYes — direct liability to policyholders (r.9(1))Rarely, and rarely enforceable by the clientNot required by the PCC Act
Pledging or rehypothecation of client assetsProhibited save custodian fees (r.8(2))Contractual only; varies by carrierNot restricted by the PCC Act
Related-party investment and lendingExpressly prohibited (r.17)Commonly permitted; house funds are widespreadNot restricted by the PCC Act
Product vetted before issueActuarial certificate, product summary and policy filed for FSC approval (r.4(2))Generic product filing at bestCell approval only; no product review
Distribution gateDual-licensed broker + investment adviser only (r.11)Commission-driven, widely distributedNo statutory gate
Rank on the issuer's insolvencyInsurance creditor, first-ranking (s.63(2)) + reserved designated fund (s.63(4)(a))Insurance creditor, but against a pooled fundCell creditor — or equity, if the client holds cell shares
Exposure to the issuer's other businessExcluded by fund and custody segregationShared with all other linked policyholdersProtected from other cells, but the cell's own creditors reach the company's non-cellular assets
Criminal sanction protecting custodyYes — s.85A Insurance ActNo equivalentNo equivalent
Minimum standard of clientUSD 250,000 professional-market threshold (r.12)Retail and mass-affluentSet by the promoter
Choice of contract statuteMauritius law by default; another governing law may be elected at policy levelUsually fixed by the carrierNot a feature of the regime

A protected cell company is an entity-law technique, not a class of insurance business. Cellular status does not confer SILIB approval, per-policy custody, related-party restrictions or the SILIB conduct regime; conversely, SILIB approval does not confer cellular segregation. Where a Mauritius PCC insurer also holds a separate SILIB approval under rule 4(1), the two operate cumulatively — which is the strongest available combination.

Professional candour

What insurance-side safety does not do

A structure marketed beyond its statutory reach becomes a liability in litigation. Every serious family office will test these limits, so we state them first.

  1. It does not, by itself, defeat the policyholder's own creditors. The SILIB regime addresses the insurer's insolvency and the insurer's conduct. Protection against the client's personal creditors comes from the law governing the contract, the law governing the owner of the policy — a trust, foundation or company — and the law of the place where enforcement is attempted. All three must be aligned with the family's actual threat model.
  2. It does not create a tax result. The FSC is explicit that the legal and tax treatment of policy proceeds follows the laws applicable to the policyholder according to their tax residency, and that SILIB introduced no change to the Code Civil Mauricien or to tax legislation. Recognition of the wrapper in the client's home jurisdiction is a separate opinion in every single case.
  3. It does not cure bad timing. No wrapper — Mauritian, Liechtenstein, Bermudian or otherwise — repairs a premium paid into a policy at a time of known creditor exposure. Implementation must be proactive, and the relevant clock must be started before the risk crystallises.
  4. It does not follow the money after payout. Once proceeds are paid out, they become ordinary property of the recipient and leave the policy architecture entirely.
  5. It does not replace carrier due diligence. Ask any prospective carrier to produce its SILIB approval under rule 4(1), the FSC approval of its custody agreement under rule 5(1), and the identity of the custodian and every sub-custodian. A long-term insurance licence alone is not a SILIB approval.
Next step

Test your carrier against the statute, not the brochure

The SILIB Handbook contains the full carrier-diligence protocol, the custody-agreement checklist under rules 8 and 9, and the insolvency analysis in detail — with every provision cited to source.

Get the Handbook Understanding SILIB