Most wealth-structuring literature asks what a policy does for the client. The harder question — and the one a UHNWI family office should ask first — is what happens to my assets if the insurer itself fails, misbehaves, or is captured. Mauritius answers that question in statute. A SILIB policy is built so that the insurer never becomes the single point of failure.
When a family places USD 5m, 50m or 500m into a life-insurance wrapper, they exchange direct ownership of assets for a contractual claim against an insurance company. That is the trade. Everything that follows — tax deferral, succession mechanics, creditor protection, treaty access — rests on that claim being worth something in the worst case.
In a conventional unit-linked policy or offshore portfolio bond, the honest answer is uncomfortable. The client's money is typically invested in pooled internal funds shared with every other linked policyholder. The assets sit on the insurer's own balance sheet. There is often no independent custodian owing the client anything. If the carrier's investment book, its shareholder, or another block of business fails, the policyholder discovers that their "segregation" was an accounting convention.
SILIB was drafted to remove each of those weaknesses individually. Not as marketing — as licence conditions, rules with criminal sanction, and an insolvency waterfall that puts the policyholder first.
“Each structured investment-linked insurance policy is backed by a segregated fund which is specific to that one policy, whereas the assets of linked long term insurance policies are pooled together and open to all linked long term policyholders.” Financial Services Commission, Mauritius — SILIB FAQ, Q12
“The assets under each structured investment-linked insurance policy have to be segregated and held separately for each policyholder with a custodian. Custodians and any sub-custodians must be approved by the FSC.” Financial Services Commission, Mauritius — SILIB FAQ, Q7
Structural safety does not come from one strong wall. It comes from barriers that a hostile party would have to defeat in different legal disciplines, in different fora, at the same time. SILIB supplies five.
Follow the sequence. At no point does the policyholder become an ordinary unsecured creditor of a collapsed company competing with banks and trade creditors for a dividend.
The policy's dedicated portfolio sits with an FSC-approved custodian, identified to that one policy, unencumbered. It is not free property of the insurer for a liquidator to gather in. SILIB Rules r.4(3), r.6, r.8(2)
No insurer may be wound up voluntarily without the FSC's prior written authority, and authority is only given where arrangements satisfactory to the FSC exist to meet all policy liabilities. A liquidator must continue the insurance business under FSC or Court direction rather than simply liquidating it. Insurance Act ss.60, 64
In a winding up, long-term policy liabilities are calculated by the method and basis determined by an actuary appointed by the Commission — not by the insurer's own estimates or its shareholder's preferred numbers. Insurance Act s.62
Assets representing the designated fund are available only for the liabilities attributable to that fund. Other classes of business, and the insurer's general creditors, are excluded from it. Insurance Act s.63(4)(a)
Any remaining deficiency is met out of the insurer's other assets, with unsatisfied policy liabilities still ranking ahead of every other claim. Shareholders receive nothing until policyholders and creditors are paid in full. Insurance Act ss.63(2), 63(3)(c), 66(2)
The liquidator may transfer the assets and liabilities to another insurer under FSC supervision, and may seek the appointment of a special manager where existing policyholders' interests require it — preserving continuity of the contract instead of crystallising a loss. Insurance Act ss.60(2), 60(4)
Most losses in offshore insurance are not caused by carrier failure. They are caused by carriers and managers monetising a captive policyholder: house funds, related-party paper, undisclosed fees, and advice given by people not qualified to give it. SILIB legislates against each of those, individually.
An insurer cannot resign. A trustee can.
A licensed insurer is bound to its contract for its full term and cannot walk away from the policyholder; where it fails, the FSC and the Court manage the outcome and a transfer to another insurer is the preferred remedy. A professional trustee, by contrast, can resign — and where no successor will accept the appointment, the structure becomes paralysed. Continuity of the counterparty is itself an asset-protection feature, and it is one of the few that cannot be replicated by drafting.
The comparison below is limited to carrier-side and custody risk. It says nothing about tax outcomes, which depend entirely on the policyholder's own residence.
Scroll the table sideways to compare →
| Risk axis | SILIB policy (Mauritius) | Conventional unit-linked / portfolio bond | Cell of a protected cell company |
|---|---|---|---|
| Unit of segregation | One dedicated portfolio per policy | Pooled internal funds shared across policyholders | The cell — which may contain many participants |
| Where the assets are held | FSC-approved independent custodian, outside the insurer | Typically on the insurer's own balance sheet | By the company, or through a nominee |
| Independent custodian owing duties to the client | Yes — direct liability to policyholders (r.9(1)) | Rarely, and rarely enforceable by the client | Not required by the PCC Act |
| Pledging or rehypothecation of client assets | Prohibited save custodian fees (r.8(2)) | Contractual only; varies by carrier | Not restricted by the PCC Act |
| Related-party investment and lending | Expressly prohibited (r.17) | Commonly permitted; house funds are widespread | Not restricted by the PCC Act |
| Product vetted before issue | Actuarial certificate, product summary and policy filed for FSC approval (r.4(2)) | Generic product filing at best | Cell approval only; no product review |
| Distribution gate | Dual-licensed broker + investment adviser only (r.11) | Commission-driven, widely distributed | No statutory gate |
| Rank on the issuer's insolvency | Insurance creditor, first-ranking (s.63(2)) + reserved designated fund (s.63(4)(a)) | Insurance creditor, but against a pooled fund | Cell creditor — or equity, if the client holds cell shares |
| Exposure to the issuer's other business | Excluded by fund and custody segregation | Shared with all other linked policyholders | Protected from other cells, but the cell's own creditors reach the company's non-cellular assets |
| Criminal sanction protecting custody | Yes — s.85A Insurance Act | No equivalent | No equivalent |
| Minimum standard of client | USD 250,000 professional-market threshold (r.12) | Retail and mass-affluent | Set by the promoter |
| Choice of contract statute | Mauritius law by default; another governing law may be elected at policy level | Usually fixed by the carrier | Not a feature of the regime |
A protected cell company is an entity-law technique, not a class of insurance business. Cellular status does not confer SILIB approval, per-policy custody, related-party restrictions or the SILIB conduct regime; conversely, SILIB approval does not confer cellular segregation. Where a Mauritius PCC insurer also holds a separate SILIB approval under rule 4(1), the two operate cumulatively — which is the strongest available combination.
A structure marketed beyond its statutory reach becomes a liability in litigation. Every serious family office will test these limits, so we state them first.
The SILIB Handbook contains the full carrier-diligence protocol, the custody-agreement checklist under rules 8 and 9, and the insolvency analysis in detail — with every provision cited to source.
Get the Handbook Understanding SILIB